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This Article presents an empirical study of attorney-client deci-
sion-making in a sample of 139 criminal cases in which the key deci-
sion was whether to pursue a clinically supported insanity defense.
The study is of interest for two reasons: first, it augments the general
literature on attorney-client interactions in criminal defense;' second,
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1 There have been several qualitative studies of relationships between criminal defend-
ants and their attorneys, usually in the context of large public defender organizations. See,
e.g., MILTON HEUMANN, PL.A BARGAINING (1978); LIsA McINTRr , THE PuBuc DEFENDER
(1987); Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation
of a Profession, 1 L. & Soc'y REv. 15 (1967). These studies have highlighted institutional
factors that provide incentives for plea bargaining, and that can erode the defense attor-
ney's ethical commitment to the interests or wishes of individual clients. The present study
does not arise out of this empirical tradition and does not view the attorney's role from an
organizational perspective. Instead, employing a case-centered, quantitative approach, we
seek to identify patterns of attorney-client interaction in relation to a particular type of
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it sheds light on the relation between client involvement in decisions
regarding the defense or disposition of criminal cases and defense at-
torneys' perceptions of their clients' competence.
The competence of criminal defendants to make decisions is of
particular importance in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1993 deci-
sion in Godinez v. Moran.2 In holding that the constitutional standard
for competence to plead guilty is the same as the standard for compe-
tence to stand trial, the Court pointed out that defendants are called
upon to make numerous decisions in the course of a criminal case,
whether or not the case is tried.3 To our knowledge, this article
presents the only systematic study of the relation between client com-
petence, as perceived by their attorneys, and decision-making
participation.
A. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In previous studies, we have investigated attorney-client interac-
tions in random samples of criminal prosecutions and in a sample of
tried cases.4 Three main findings emerged from these studies. First,
more than half of the defendants are described by their attorneys as
passive participants in the overall defense, 5 with about one in ten de-
scribed as uninvolved or "extremely passive."6 Second, about ten per-
cent of clients are described by their attorneys as recalcitrant, i.e., as
rarely or never accepting the attorneys' advice.7 Interestingly, passiv-
ity and recalcitrance are reported less frequently when attorneys are
asked to focus specifically on situations in which the law requires per-
sonal client participation, such as the decision to plead guilty or, in
tried cases, the decision to waive a jury trial, than when attorneys are
asked to characterize clients' overall participation in decision-mak-
ing.8 The third main finding emerging from our previous research is
that attorneys have some doubt about the mental capacity of their cli-
ents in eight to fifteen percent of felony cases, although mental health
decision. As explained below, see infra text acccompanying note 14, the cases studied com-
prise a sample of defendants referred for forensic evaluation by attorneys throughout the
state of Michigan. Most of the referring attorneys were not public defenders.
2 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
3 Id. at 398-99.
4 Norman Poythress et al., Attorney-Client Decision Making in Criminal Cases: Findings
from Three Studies, 18 LA.w & HUM. BEHA'v. 437 (1994); Steven Y Hoge et al., Attorney-Client
Decision-Making in Criminal Cases: Client Competence and Participation as Perceived by Their At-
torneys, 10 BEHAV. Scr. & L. 385 (1992).
5 Hoge et al., supra note 4, at 390.
6 Poythress et al., supra note 4, at 442.
7 Id.
8 Id.; Hoge et al., supra note 4, at 390.
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assessments are sought in less than half of these cases. 9 The preva-
lence of reported client passivity is substantially higher among clients
whose competence is doubted than among clients whose competence
is unquestioned by their attorneys.' 0
B. THE PRESENT STUDY
The rate of perceived mental impairment in the general defend-
ant populations sampled in our previous studies was too low to permit
a thorough examination of the relation between client mental impair-
ment (as perceived by their attorneys) and attorney-client interaction.
Because the rate of perceived impairment is likely to be substantially
higher in a population of defendants with clinically supported insanity
claims, these cases present an opportunity to study the impact of per-
ceived impairment on the decision-making process."
Decisions concerning the insanity defense also provide an inter-
esting context for studying broad questions relating to the allocation
of decision-making prerogatives in criminal defense. It is clear, for
example, that attorneys are obligated to adhere to the instructions of
competent clients who refuse to plead insanity.12 It is not clear, how-
ever, that this norm entails the further obligation to facilitate client
participation in decisions to pursue, or not to pursue, the defense.
Thus, a study of insanity plea decisions presents a unique opportunity




The Center for Forensic Psychiatry (CFP) in Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan, is a state-operated forensic hospital that conducts pre-trial evalua-
tions for courts throughout the state. The CFP's computerized
database was utilized to identify all cases for calendar years 1990
9 Hoge et al., supra note 4, at 389; Poythress et al., supra note 4, at 441.
10 Hoge et al., supra note 4, at 388; Poythress et al., supra note 4, at 442. The causal
relation between perceived incompetence and passivity is not clear. The defendant's pas-
sivity could be interpreted, correctly or incorrectly, as a sign of incompetence. Alterna-
tively, attorneys who have doubts about their clients' competence may not seek their
involvement in the decision-making process. We suspect that passivity and perceived in-
competence are related in both of these ways.
11 See, e.g., Carmen Cirincione, Henry J. Steadman & Margaret A. McGreevy, Rates of
Insanity Acquittals and the Factors Associated with Successful Insanity Pleas, 23 BULL. AMER.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 399 (1995) (diagnosis of severe mental illness is best predictor of
successful insanity pleas).
12 See Treece v. Maryland, 547 A.2d 1054, 1062 (Md. 1988). See generally ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Std. 4-5.2 and cmt. (1993).
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through 1992 in which the CFP's forensic examiner had returned a
clinical opinion supportive of the insanity defense. 13 One hundred
seventy-six such cases were identified. Data were retrieved from CFP
case records regarding client characteristics (e.g., demographics, diag-
nostic and treatment information) and historical variables of interest
(e.g., prior criminal record, history of prior psychiatric treatment).
Information regarding attorney-client interaction and decision-mak-




Archival and interview data were entered on an eighteen-page re-
search protocol designed specifically for this study. Two pages were
devoted to data from the CEP case record, while the remainder of the
protocol recorded attorneys' responses to inquiries about (i) case out-
comes; (ii) strategies; (iii) attorneys' perceptions of clients' attitudes,
competence, and level of participation in case decisions; and (iv) in-
teractions with clients about whether to pursue the not guilty by rea-
son of insanity (NGRI) defense made available by the CFP examiner's
report.
C. PROCEDURES
The telephone interviews were conducted fromJuly 1991 through
December 1993. Beginning with cases evaluated at the CFP during
the 1990 calendar year, successive waves of about twenty cases each
were selected for follow-up. A letter was sent on CFP letterhead to the
attorney's office; it described the study and advised the attorney that a
CFP staff member would be calling in the near future to conduct a
telephone interview about the case. Initial phone contacts attempted
either to complete the telephone interview or to set a specific date
and time for a subsequent call during which the attorney could be
debriefed regarding the case. In most cases, multiple phone calls
were required to arrange the interview. As protocols were nearing
completion for one wave of mailings, another group of letters was sent
13 We sampled retrospecitvely to identify recent cases that had reached final disposi-
tion, thereby avoiding the ethical difficulties that would arise in investigating "live" cases.
14 Attorneys' accounts of attorney-client interaction may be biased by the attorneys'
imperfect recollections or their self-serving responses. We responded to this concern in
one of our earlier studies by interviewing both attorneys and clients in 35 cases. Poythress
et al., supra note 4, at 446-49. We found that, although the perceptions of attorneys and
their clients were not in perfect accord, there was substantial agreement on most measures
(e.g. degree of client passivity, ratings of client involvement in decision-making), leading
us to conclude that attorneys provide a reasonably reliable account of attorney-client inter-
actions on the measures being employed in our studies.
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out.
Protocols were completed for 139 of the 176 cases (77%). Incom-
plete protocols typically resulted from difficulty reaching an attorney
who had changed offices since the CFP evaluation; in a few cases the
attorney was contacted but reported little or no memory for specific
details and impressions about the case. Based on information re-
corded in the CFP records (e.g., offense, defendant's diagnosis, demo-
graphic characteristics), the completed cases were not significantly
different from the uncompleted ones.
III. RESULTS
A. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The 139 defendants whose attorneys were debriefed were pre-
dominately white (69%) males (87%) who were charged with a felony
(93%) and were unemployed (77%) at the time of arrest. Most (73%)
had been previously convicted of a felony charge and had previously
received treatment in a psychiatric hospital (82%) on one or more
occasions.
As expected with this sample, the overwhelming majority (n =
118, 85%) received a primary diagnosis of a major psychiatric disor-
der: schizophrenia (n = 77, 55%); mood disorder (n = 25, 18%); delu-
sional disorder (n = 9, 6%); or other psychosis (n = 7, 5%). Other
primary diagnoses included: organic disorders (n = 8, 6%); mental
retardation (n = 4, 3%); alcohol/drug abuse or dependence (n = 3,
2%); and autistic disorder, anxiety disorder, adjustment disorder, or
organic personality disorder (1 each). Primary diagnosis for one case
was missing.
B. THE FORENSIC EVALUATION
These defendants were referred to the CFP for pretrial evaluation
of their criminal responsibility (100%) and their competence to stand
trial (89%).15 Of those referred for competence evaluation, more
than half (64%) were found by the examiners to be clearly compe-
tent, some (6%) were believed to be marginally competent, and the
remainder (30%) were found to be incompetent at the time of evalua-
tion. Most defendants had been hospitalized at some point during
the pretrial phase of their cases, either to restore competence (37%)
or for other psychiatric treatment (32%). Interestingly, most of the
defendants (90%) were on medication, usually anti-psychotic drugs,
during the evaluation.
15 Most (87%) of the evaluations were conducted on an outpatient basis.
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Based on the written CFP Report, it appears that most (85%) of
the defendants cooperated during the evaluation. Among the 21 de-
fendants who were uncooperative, 13 refused to answer any questions,
11 were thought to have concealed pathological symptoms, and 4
were thought to have malingered (i.e., fabricated psychiatric
symptoms).
C. CLIENT PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION TO SEEK EVALUATION
Attorneys were asked to rate the client's participation in the deci-
sion to seek the CFP evaluations. In most cases, the client willingly
followed the attorney's recommendation to participate in the evalua-
tion, but the attorneys sometimes made the referral without consult-
ing the client (11%) or over the client's objection (8%).
D. CLIENT COMPETENCE AS PERCEIVED BY THEIR ATTORNEYS
Not surprisingly, attorneys reported that they had "doubts about
[their] client's mental capacity to participate in his/her own defense"
at some point during the litigation in almost three-fourths (72%) of
the cases. 16 These doubts pertained to most competence-related abili-
ties, as shown in Table 1. Of particular interest is the fact that the
clients' ability to make rational decisions was more often perceived to
be impaired (63%) than their ability to understand the charges (37%)
or the nature and purpose of a criminal prosecution (44%). Doubts
about clients' decision-making ability often led the attorneys to seek
consultation or proxy decision-making from third parties: in 45% of
the cases, attorneys reported they consulted parents, spouses, or other
relatives in making case decisions.
E. CASE DISPOSITION AND OUTCOME
Table 2 reveals case disposition and outcome. Complete informa-
tion was available for 123 cases.17 In 14% of the cases, all charges were
dismissed. Forty-one percent of the cases (n = 51) were resolved by
plea or stipulation; stipulated findings of NGRI accounted for about
one half of the non-tried dispositions (n = 25). Where the defendant
pleaded guilty (n = 21) or guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) (n = 5), the
plea was usually (63%) to reduced charges.' 8 In the cases (n = 55)
that went to trial, the insanity defense was raised in 96% of cases and
16 Attorneys were not asked to rate the "degree of doubt" or the intensity of their con-
cern about possible client incompetence.
17 Cases for which complete dispositional information was available did not differ in
any significant way from cases in which dispositional information was incomplete.
18 In cases resolved by plea, 76% involved plea agreements.
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TABLE 1
ATTORNEY DOUBTS ABOUT CLIENT COMPETENCE (n = 139)
Percent of cases in which attorneys had doubts about client's ability to:
Understand charges 37
Understand nature of criminal prosecution 44
Understand role of defense att'y 32
Recognize and relate relevant facts 53
Trust defense attorney 22
Understand decision s/he was called upon to make 57
Make rational decisions 63
was successful in 91% of the cases in which it was raised.' 9 Overall, the
insanity defense was successfully pursued in 71% of the non-dismissed
cases, representing 61% of the cases in which the CFP had reached an
opinion supporting such a defense.
TABLE 2
DISPOSITION OF CASES WITH AVAILABLE NGRI DEFENSE (%) (n = 123)
All Charges Dismissed 13.8








F. DEFENDANTS' REACTIONS TO CFP EVALUATION
Curiously, in 4% of the cases the attorney did not even advise the
client of an available NGRI opinion.20 Most defendants (60%) were
receptive to the idea of asserting an insanity defense and to an explan-
atory formulation that attributed their offense to symptoms of their
illness. Of particular interest, however, is the finding that 10% of de-
fendants resisted an insanity plea and another 15% were unreceptive
to the attribution of mental illness. The remaining defendants were
indifferent. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical estimate of
the frequency with which defendants who have an available insanity
19 The trial cases were almost always (91%) before ajudge sitting without ajury.
20 In these six cases, two were dismissed, three were resolved by GBMI pleas and one
was resolved by a trial finding of NGRI.
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defense are likely to voice opposition to some aspect of the opinion.
G. OVERALL PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING
Attorneys were asked to rate their clients' overall participation in
decision-making. The sample was about evenly split between those
who were viewed generally as being passively (46%) versus actively
(54%) involved in case decision-making. About 25% were regarded as
uninvolved or "extremely passive," while on the other extreme, 13%
were rated as "extremely active." Most defendants were characterized
as generally willing to follow counsel's recommendations, but 9%
were described as "rarely" or "never" accepting their attorney's advice.
TABLE 3
RELATION BETWEEN CLIENT PARTICIPATION AND CLIENT COMPETENCE,
AS PERCEIVED BY THEIR ATrORNEYs
Defendants with
General Population of Clinically Supported
Criminal Defendants (Tampa)' Insanity Claims (Michigan)2
Competence Competence Competence Competence
Doubted Not Doubted Doubted Not Doubted
n=32 (8%) n=368 (92%) n=95 (72%) n=36 (28%)
Accepting Advice
Always 41 45 62 75
Usually 31 32 19 19
Sometimes 6 17 7 3
Rarely 9 4 7 3
Never 12 2 4 0
Client Participation
Active 41 59 27 42
Passive 25 32 43 46
Extemely Passive 34 9 30 14
Combined samples of defendants described in Study 1 and Study 1 in Poythress et al.,
supra note 4.
2 Total N = 131, rather than 139, due to missing data.
As Table 3 shows, however, attorneys' perceptions about client
participation were related to whether they expressed doubts about
their clients' competence, a finding that also emerged in our studies
of a general defendant population. The data in Table 3 compare at-
torney perceptions about client participation compiled in our Tampa
study of a general population of criminal defendants with attorney
perceptions from the present sample of Michigan defendants with
clinically supported insanity claims. The data show that in both sam-
ples defendants whose competence is doubted were perceived to be
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markedly more passive in decision-making, and somewhat less "com-
pliant," than clients whose competence was not doubted. The key dif-
ference between the two samples is that attorneys expressed doubts
about the competence of 72% of the Michigan defendants with clini-
cally supported insanity claims, compared with only 8% of the general
population of criminal defendants in Tampa.
H. THE DECISION WHETHER TO PURSUE AN NGRI DEFENSE
Attorneys described the process by which they and their clients
decided whether or not to pursue the insanity defense in 134 cases.
2 '
It was ultimately decided that the NGRI defense would not be pursued
in twenty cases, while the decision was made to enter an insanity plea
in 114 cases. Table 4 summarizes data provided by the attorneys re-
garding discussions with their clients about this important decision.
In the twenty cases in which the defense was not pursued, the
decision-making process usually followed one of two expected pat-
terns. In seven of the cases, the case had already been dismissed or
the defendant had already decided to plead guilty before the report
was received. In eight of the cases, the attorney discussed the report
with the client, and recommended that the defense not be raised, and
the client followed the recommended advice. (In three cases the at-
torney discussed the report with the client but made no recommenda-
tion, leaving it to the client to decide how to proceed.) Two of these
twenty cases are of special interest because they involved disagree-
ments between the attorney and client-the attorney recommended
that the defense be raised and the client rejected this advice; in one of
these cases, the attorney unsuccessfully sought the court's permission
to advance the defense over the client's objection.
In 85% of the cases, an insanity plea was pursued. In more than
half (53%) of these cases, the decision was made with full client partic-
ipation: in 43% of the cases, the attorney received the report, dis-
cussed it with the client, recommended that the defense be pursued,
and the client followed the attorney's recommendation without objec-
tion; and in another 10% of the cases, the attorney entered an insanity
plea based on an implicit delegation of authority from the client-
either pursuant to a previous understanding with the client on the
course of action to be followed upon receipt of the report or in antici-
pation of client ratification at a later time.
In only two cases did the attorney and client have an overt disa-
greement. In one case the client decided to raise the insanity defense
in the face of the attorney's contrary advice; in this case, the client
21 Inadequate information was available in 5 cases.
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TABLE 4
ATrORNEY-CLIENT INTERACTION IN INSANIY DEFENSE DECISIONS (%)
Defense Defense
All cases Not Raised Raised
(n = 134) (n 20) (n = 114)
Disposition Arranged Before Report Received 10 35, 6
Client Followed Attorney Recommendation 51 40 53
Client Decided without Attorney
Recommendation 5 15 3
Client and Attorney Disagreed 3 10 2
Attorney Made Decision Without Consulting
Client 31 - 36
eventually decided to plead guilty. In a second case, a client who
strongly resisted the insanity plea eventually decided to pursue the
defense due to pressure from his family; in this case, the defendant
was eventually found NGRI at trial.
In more than one-third (36%) of the cases in which the insanity
defense was pursued the attorneys appear to have pre-empted their
clients' participation in the decision-making process. That is, the at-
torneys made the decision to pursue the insanity defense on their
own, without meaningful client participation-they did not discuss
the matter with the client at all or they presented a negotiated insanity
plea to the client as a fait accompli.
I. EXPLANATION FOR ATTORNEYS' PREEMPTIVE BEHAVIOR
Among the cases in which the attorneys preempted client partici-
pation (n = 41), the attorneys were asked to explain their reasons for
not discussing the decision with the client. In response, they usually
indicated either that the insanity defense was the only real choice and
that there was nothing to discuss (50%), or that they doubted their
clients' competence to participate meaningfully in the decision-mak-
ing process (38%).22 Not surprisingly, preemptive behavior was asso-
ciated with other indicators of perceived client incompetence, such as
whether the client had been hospitalized for treatment before trial
(X2(132.3) = 11.88, p = .008) and whether the attorney expressed
doubts about the client's ability to understand important case deci-
sions (X2(97.1) = 4.07, p = .04). Interestingly, however, the attorneys
who preempted client participation in the insanity plea decision were
no more likely to seek consultation or proxy decisions from relatives
22 In the few remaining cases, the attorneys indicated either that they consciously pre-
cluded the defendants' involvement due to anticipated disagreement (n = 2) or that they
usually make decisions of this nature without client participation (n = 3).
19961
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than attorneys who elicited client involvement.
IV. DISCUSSION
Results from our previous work provide a backdrop for the pres-
ent findings. Our previous studies of attorney-client decision-making
focused on unselected samples of criminal cases. The attorneys in
those studies described their clients as somewhat passive in general,
but reported a high degree of client involvement in the discrete deci-
sions for which well-established legal norms mandate client participa-
tion-e.g., whether to testify at trial, waive ajury and request a bench
trial, or plead guilty.
The present study focuses on a single decision-whether or not
to pursue a clinically supported insanity defense-in a sample of de-
fendants selected precisely because a favorable clinical opinion had
been rendered. Clearly the decision whether to pursue the insanity
defense was the pivotal strategic issue in these cases, and the prospect
of psychiatric labelling, stigmatization, and indeterminate hospitaliza-
tion would seem to place this issue squarely within the realm of client
autonomy. Not surprisingly, one-fourth of the clients resisted the at-
tributions of mental disorder, insanity, or non-responsibility repre-
sented by the forensic findings. Notwithstanding the arguments that
can be made against raising the insanity defense, it was pursued in
85% of the cases in this study, including 79% of the cases in which
clients had resisted one or more of the clinical findings. Moreover,
contrary to our expectations, the rate of reported disagreement be-
tween the attorneys and the clients regarding the insanity plea was
relatively low.
Surprisingly, the main finding in this study pertains to the lack of
client involvement: we find that the attorneys made the decision with-
out consulting the defendant in about one-third of the cases in which
the defense was raised and that the degree of client participation was
relatively low even when the client was consulted.
The key question is, what accounts for the observed pattern of
attorney dominance? In our view, this pattern is attributable to two
related factors: an ambiguous ethical norm relating to the attorney's
obligation to facilitate client participation, and a distinct tendency to-
ward paternalistic decision-making in cases involving defendants with
documented histories of serious mental illness.
A. THE AMBIGUOUS LEGAL NORM
It is now well settled that defense attorneys are obligated to ad-
here to client wishes on basic issues relating to the defense or disposi-
ATTORNEY-CLIENT DECISION-MA.KNG
tion of the case, including the "theory of defense" and the plea. Until
recently, however, decisions whether to raise the insanity defense were
outside the defendant's sphere of control. In many states, the insanity
defense could be interposed by the court and, in some states, by the
prosecution, without regard to the defendant's wishes.2 3 Moreover,
the defendant's preferences on this issue probably were not even
binding on the defense attorney. Within the past twenty years, how-
ever, the governing legal norm has shifted decisively. A line of recent
cases, beginning with Frendak v. United States,24 has established not
only that the insanity defense may not be interposed by the state, but
also that the defense attorney must adhere to the wishes of a compe-
tent defendant who declines to raise the defense. 25 Michigan law is in
accord with the prevailing rule.2 6,
Beyond the duty to adhere to the client's known wishes, however,
the attorney's legal obligation is ambiguous. Two key questions
presented in this study are whether an attorney is obligated to present
to the client the possibility of raising a- clinically supported insanity
defense and, if so, whether the attorney is obligated to facilitate an
informed client decision.2 7 Informed client decision-making may be
an aspirational ethical ideal but, in Michigan and elsewhere, it is by no
means clear that attorneys have a legal obligation to achieve it. s
In the absence of any alternative exculpatory claim, the attorney
may be justified in assuming, without inviting client participation, that
an available insanity plea serves the client's interest in avoiding crimi-
nal conviction. If a negotiated insanity plea is entered, or if the de-
fense is raised at trial, the defendant will have the opportunity to
object if he wishes to do so. 2 9 Thus, it can be argued that by deciding
23 See, e.g., Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en banc),
overruled by United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
24 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
25 For a full discussion, see Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1988).
26 In People v. Newton, 446 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), the court held that a
defense attorney who adhered to a competent client's wishes to forego an available insanity
defense provided constitutionally adequate representation, strongly implying that an attor-
ney is obligated to follow the client's instruction or withdraw from the case. This conforms
to the prevailing understanding.
27 See generally RichardJ. Bonnie, The Competence of CriminalDefendants: Beyond Dusky and
Drope, 47 U. MImi L. REv. 539, 568-70 (1993).
28 There appear to be no Michigan cases directly on point-i.e., cases in which an
attorney decided to pursue an insanity defense without consulting the defendant. How-
ever, in one recent case, the court characterized the attorney's decision to invoke the de-
fense as a defensible exercise of trial strategy because it presented the best chance for
acquittal, adding only as an afterthought the defense attorney's testimony that the defend-
ant had consented to this strategy. People v. Edward, MicHtGNo LAvYRs' WEEKLY, Oct. 18,
1993, at 23A (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
29 In the present study, for example, the outcomes in the "pre-empted" cases were as
1996]
60BONNIE, POYTHRESS, HOGE, MONAHAN, & ETSENBERG[Vol. 87
to pursue the defense, the attorney does not preclude a client's subse-
quent veto.
In sum, it is possible that the governing legal norm reflects a
"weak" conception of client autonomy. Under a "strong" conception,
the attorney would be obligated to present the issue to the client in all
cases and to facilitate informed client participation. However, under
the weaker conception that appears to prevail in practice, the attorney
is expected to adhere to the known wishes of the client but has no
affirmative duty to secure the client's involvement.
In light of the high prevalence of attorney preemption in deci-
sions to pursue the insanity defense revealed in this study, it is interest-
ing to note that a similar pattern did not emerge in the twenty cases in
which the insanity defense was not pursued. It appears that clients
participated in all of these decisions. In this context, however, the
legal norm is not ambiguous: when the attorney decides to forego an
available insanity defense, the attorney is probably obligated to elicit
client participation, especially if the attorney advises the defendant to
plead guilty. 0
B. ATTORNEY PATERNALISM
It also appears that the attorneys' paternalistic intuitions play a
significant role in explaining their behavior. The attorneys explicitly
linked their preemptive behavior with perceived client incompetence
in 38% of the cases, and responses to other questions about client
competence showed that 91% of the attorneys who preempted client
participation had doubts about their clients' capacity "to understand
the decisions they were called upon to make." In addition, decisions
to preempt client involvement were associated with the clients' hospi-
follows: dismissal of case (n = 6); NGRI plea (n = 10); G or GBMI plea (n = 2); NGRI at trial
(n = 18); and G at trial (n = 2).
30 The usual cases in Michigan, as elsewhere, involve post-conviction claims that the
defense attorney should have raised the insanity defense. In these cases, the Sixth Amend-
ment claim usually turns on whether the attorney made an informed professional judg-
ment. Convictions are sometimes set aside. See, e.g., People v. Hunt, 427 N.W.2d 907
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Snyder, 310 N.W.2d 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). For our
purposes, the key question is whether a conviction will be set aside, even if the attorney
made an informed professional judgment, on the ground that he did not present the mat-
ter to the client for decision. In cases which went to trial, no rulings setting aside convic-
tions have been identified. However, in People v. Nyberg, 362 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984), the court set aside a GBMI verdict (and a life sentence) because the defendant
had not been informed "that he had a reasonable likelihood of successfully interposing a
valid and complete defense to the charge." Nyberg stands at most for the proposition that
an attorney should inform the defendant of any potentially successful defense before advis-
ing him to plead guilty.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT DECISION-MAKING
talization for treatment during the pre-trial phase.31
The tendency of attorneys to take a paternalistic stance in dealing
with mentally ill clients has been well-documented in the context of
civil commitment, where aggressive advocacy against commitment is
often forsaken in favor of a role resembling that of a guardian ad li-
tern.3 2 Even in customary representational contexts, codes of ethics
are remarkably ambiguous regarding the allocation of decision-mak-
ing responsibility. In fact, the codes imply that attorneys are ethically
permitted to make decisions on behalf of impaired clients, even in the
absence of a legal determination of incompetence.33 In short, the be-
havior of the Michigan attorneys in this study appears to reveal an
unambiguous instance of "soft" paternalism in legal representation.
3 4
V. CONCLUSION
The findings of this study show why it is desirable, as one of us has
previously suggested,3 5 to conceptualize competence in criminal adju-
dication as two separable constructs: a foundational requirement of
"competence to assist counsel" which refers to the minimum condi-
31 It is possible that the very fact of client hospitalization impeded client consultation,
and that the attorneys' preemptive behavior reflected logisitical difficulties rather than
paternalistic decision making. For example, we wondered whether the attorneys may have
been required by statute to file notice of a possible insanity plea before they had the oppor-
tunity to meet with their clients. This explanation seems unlikely, however. The proce-
dural clock would not have been running during the period of pre-trial hospitalization for
competence restoration. Moreover, even if attorneys decided on their own, due to logisti-
cal difficulties, to give notice of a planned insanity plea, they still had plenty of time to
discuss the issue with their clients before the scheduled trial.
32 See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training
Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 Lw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 18 (1978).
33 See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, Rule 1.14 cmt. (1992) ("When the
client... suffers from a mental disorder or disability... maintaining the ordinary client-
lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects .... If the person has no guardian or
legal representative, the lawyer often must act as de facto guardian."; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY EC 7-12 (1978) ("If a client under disability has no legal rep-
resentative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf
of the client.")
34 An instance of "hard paternalism" is when one overrides the wishes of a competent
actor who has made a voluntary choice on the ground that what the person wants to do is
not in his or her best interests. Libertarians who object to hard paternalism will usually
accept some form of "soft" paternalism under which the intervention is made because the
subject is not competent to decide what is in his or her best interests or because of some
other defect of voluntariness. The residual controversies relate to the definition of the
conditions which justify paternalistic interventions (e.g., impairment of decisional abili-
ties). See generally 3 JOEL FEINBERO, HARM TO SELF 12-16 (1986).
35 Bonnie, supra note 27; Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A
Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 291 (1992) [hereinafter Bonnie, A Theoretical
Reformulation). For a generally supportive critique, see BruceJ. Winick, Reforming Incompe-
tency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J.
CEuM. L. & CRIMrNOLOGY 571 (1995).
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tions required for participation in one's own defense; and a contextu-
alized concept of "decisional competence" which has independent
legal significance only in cases in which the defendant is competent to
assist counsel. If a defendant lacks the abilities required to under-
stand the proceedings and assist counsel, the dignity and reliability of
any ensuing adjudication cannot be assured; this is why a defendant's
lack of "competence to assist counsel" precludes conviction. However,
if the defendant is competent to assist counsel, a discrete defect of
decisional competence can be addressed through remedies other
than barring adjudication, such as default rules or surrogate decision-
making.
As previously noted, 36 decisional impairments relating to pleas of
insanity have arisen with sufficient frequency to lead courts to subdi-
vide competence in a manner which tracks the distinction between
decisional competence and "competence to assist counsel." The re-
ported cases involve defendants who refuse to plead insanity; in these
cases-in which the defendant is regarded as competent to undersand
the charges and assist counsel, but not competent to make a rational
decision regarding the insanity plea-courts have sometimes allowed
the defense to be raised by a surrogate decision-maker: the defense
attorney, a guardian, or the court. As the present study shows, how-
ever, "refusing" defendants represent only a small fraction of defend-
ants who have clinically supported insanity claims, and the typical case
involves an "assenting" defendant whose decision-making ability is
questionable. In practice, it appears, attorneys serve as surrogate deci-
sion-makers in these cases.
Some would argue that a disposition which deprives the defend-
ant of liberty should not be arranged in the absence of an autono-
mous decision by the defendant him or herself. From this
perspective, the results of this study are disturbing because they reveal
that most defendants who are acquitted by reason of insanity are per-
ceived by their lawyers as having significant impairments of decisional
competence, and that one-third of them play no meaningful role in
the decision to seek this disposition. Even if surrogate decision-mak-
ing is regarded as an acceptable response in these cases, as we believe
it is, attorneys should take appropriate steps to invite and facilitate the
maximum feasible participation of which the defendant is capable.
This should be an ethical imperative even if it is not a legal one.
36 Bonnie, A Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 35, at 308-11.
